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Shareholder activism has been in the spotlight of practitioners and academics for the 
increasingly bold moves and strategies with the purpose of changing companies’ organizational 
environment and activities. For this reason, the main goal of this dissertation is to understand 
whether shareholder activism influences firms’ performance. We use a unique dataset that 
contains information of these activist shareholders’ campaigns, such as the target company, the 
type of proposal, the industry and country of the target company, and other needful data. The 
results obtained suggest that the activist shareholders’ intervention in the companies’ 
organizational practices has a negative impact on the target companies’ profitability in the years 
following the campaign announcement. However, this impact is more prominent until the end 
of the first year after the campaign announcement date. 
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O investimento ativista tem vindo a ganhar uma popularidade crescente entre praticantes 
e académicos graças às jogadas e estratégias cada vez mais arrojadas, cujo propósito é mudar o 
ambiente organizacional e atividades das empresas. Por esta razão, o objetivo principal desta 
dissertação é compreender os efeitos do investimento ativista na performance das empresas. 
Para tal, usámos uma base de dados única que contém a informação relativamente às campanhas 
levadas a cabo por estes investidores ativistas, tal como a empresa-alvo, o tipo de proposta, a 
indústria e país da empresa-alvo, entre outros dados necessários. Os resultados obtidos sugerem 
que a intervenção dos investidores ativistas nas práticas organizacionais das empresas tem um 
impacto negativo na rentabilidade das empresas-alvo nos anos subsequentes ao anúncio da 
campanha. No entanto, este impacto é mais acentuado até ao fim do primeiro ano após o anúncio 
da campanha ativista. 
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With the development of an increasingly conscious, demanding and volatile 
world, the intervention of activist shareholders in companies’ dynamics has gained more 
and more prominence. There are several definitions regarding shareholder activism, but 
all focus in a core idea: they influence a corporation’s behaviour. By exercising their 
ownership rights as partial owners, whether through a vote on shareholder proposals or 
through direct dialogue with the company about a specific issue, activist shareholders 
attempt to pressure the firm to change its corporate behaviour (O’Rourke, 2003). 
Religious, environmental and union groups, as well as social investors are all possible 
ways to intervene as an activist shareholder (Rehbein et al., 2004). According to Guay et 
al. (2004), shareholder activism contemplates simultaneously socially responsible 
investment (SRI), corporate governance and stakeholder activism, with the maximization 
of returns being their primary goal. However, this novel topic is still fairly unexplored in 
existent literature. 
According to a 2018 report by Activist Insight, the number of governance-related 
proposals from activists has gradually increased, with an average growth of about 11% 
from 2014 to 2018 and campaigns targeting 805 companies worldwide in 2017. The 
investment in these campaigns has expanded as well, reaching up to $200 billion in 2016, 
comparing to $47 billion in 2010. There is also a notable geographic expansion of this 
movement: national campaigns have been launched in various European countries, 
including France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Spain, with 20% of total activist 
shareholder funds now focusing outside the English-speaking world (Ponomareva, 2018). 
Shareholder activism is currently marking its way to the spotlight of the world of 
business and investment and given its growing influence in the markets’ dynamics, it 
becomes a fascinating topic to explore. It is this influence in the target companies’ 
performance, as well as its impact on these companies’ organizational environment that 
drives this study. This dissertation aims to add clarification as to whether activist 
shareholders effectively affect the performance of target firms. 
To answer the research question of this dissertation “Do activist shareholders’ 
intervention affect the target firms’ performance?”, we use a unique dataset that 
combines information concerning activist shareholders’ proposals to target companies, 
where are displayed the target firms’ industry and country, the type of proposal, the 
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announcement date, the current status of the campaign, among other significant aspects. 
The sample period goes from 1988 to 2019, with a total of 884 firm-year observations. 
Subsequently, an empirical analysis was performed, evidencing the negative and 
meaningful impact of this type of activism in the target companies’ financial performance 
in the years that follow the activist campaign announcement, with this effect being more 
prominent until the end of the first year after the targeting. 
With all the conclusions reached in this study, we were able to contribute, with 
solid results regarding firm performance after the targeting, to the existent research in this 
somewhat unexplored but truly contemporary field that is the shareholder activism. 
The remaining of the study is organized as follows: firstly, we provide a historical 
overview over shareholder activism and discuss the existent literature; in section 3, the 
data and methodology are presented; in the last two chapters we present the main 
conclusions of the study, some limitations that emerged and suggestions for future studies 
on this topic. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. A quick look at activism history 
The current wave of shareholder activism began back in 1942 through a rule 
introduced by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which was the first 
regulation to allow shareholders to submit proposals for inclusion on corporate votes 
(Gillan & Starks, 2007). In the past, activists announced their participation by collecting 
5% of a company and filing a form 13-D with SEC. Today, although they may hold a 
smaller stake, they can still convince other investors to take their side, whether through 
the use of media exposure, shareholder letter or high-profile proxy fights (Biggar, 2018). 
Recently, with the confidence and credibility that these investors have gained 
throughout the years, they are now seeking bigger targets. For instance, General Electric 
and Procter & Gamble are now working with activist investors in an attempt to turn 
around their businesses (Biggar, 2018). Also, activist shareholders are becoming more 
collaborative and more willing to work with management teams. This is a relevant 
contrast to the large institutional investors in the past that pursued purely financial 
strategies and kept a low profile in governance (Ponomareva, 2018). 
Passive-management voting patterns are changing as well, with large passive fund 
managers increasingly voting against management on topics such as director elections 
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and shareholder rights. For instance, in mid-2017, both BlackRock and Vanguard pushed 
the giant ExxonMobil (XOM) to provide annual climate-risk reporting (Biggar, 2018). 
Finally, activist investors are becoming more adventurous and bolder. According 
to Cyriac et al. (2014), US-listed target companies had in 2013 an average market 
capitalization of $10 billion— up from $8 billion just a year earlier and the $2 billion at 
the end of the last decade. This was complemented with an increase in the number of 
campaigns, with an average of 240 campaigns being launched between 2010 to 2013, 
doubling the number of a decade before. Although activist investors represent a relatively 
small group ($75 billion in combined assets) compared to the hedge-fund industry ($2,5 
trillion), the truth is that activists reveal a higher rate of asset growth than hedge-funds, 
attracting in this way new partnerships with traditional investors. After all, activist 
shareholders have both the capital and the leverage to continue engaging large-size 
companies. 
 
2.2 The Resolution Process: overview 
Before exploring the impacts and motivations of shareholder activism, it is 
relevant to discuss how does this journey truly starts: the resolution filing. According to 
Logsdon and Buren (2009), the rules for shareholders to file resolutions for companies 
listed on U.S stock exchanges are set by SEC and the shareholder must hold at least 
$2,000 in stock for at least one year before filing any resolution. Moreover, there are 
plenty restrictions regarding the form and content of these resolutions that must be 
fulfilled. Logsdon and Buren (2009) describe the resolution process in three steps. First, 
shareholder activists identify an issue related to corporate social responsibility (CSR) or 
ethical behaviour that is not being successfully approached (or at all) by large 
corporations. Secondly, the shareholders engage in investigation and discussion with 
potential allies. The goal is to clearly define the best strategy to implement, given the 
target firm’s current practices and dynamics. Typically, the more complex the issue is, 
the more research and discussion is required. Finally, the shareholders proceed with 
asking for the creation of a report or something that gives them the idea that the firm can 
solve the issue. If the firm’s response is insufficient in shareholders’ point of view, they 
can either write a letter to the company seeking a dialogue opportunity or they can file a 
resolution. However, it is considered indelicate to proceed with filing a resolution without 
a previous attempt to communicate with the company.  Regarding the initial letter, the 
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target company can choose to ignore it or to engage in dialogue with the activists. In 
contrast, when a resolution is submitted, a company can request a “no-action” letter – the 
reactive response – which permits the company to omit the resolution filing in the proxy 
statements to all its shareholders without being penalized in any form. Nevertheless, the 
absence of this letter combined with the omission of the resolution targeting is punishable 
and SEC’s enforcement action is required. The alternative to the “no-action” letter is to 
enter in dialogue with the activist shareholders that filed the resolution – the proactive 
response – in an attempt to come to an agreement. In fact, the majority of targets either 
adopt the proposed resolutions or change successfully their behaviour concerning the 
issue at an organizational level, leading to a possible withdrawn of the resolution (Smith, 
1996), which is usually what happens after the dialogue with the company (Logsdon & 
Buren, 2009). Afterwards, there is a constant evaluation from the shareholders of whether 
the issue is being dealt with correctly by the company; if not, the resolution can be refiled. 
 
2.3 Causes and Targets 
Along with the development of activism among shareholders, an interest in 
understanding what urges and motivates the shareholders to choose to influence a 
particular company’s practices was also emerging among researchers. According to Judge 
et al. (2010), there can be two types of motivations behind these shareholder's actions: (i) 
financially-motivated activism and (ii) socially-motivated activism. In the first case, the 
activist investors pressure the managers and/or directors to change some issues that 
appear to be mismanaged by the firm. In particular, financial issues. The proposals 
resulting from this type of motivation are usually related to excessive executive 
compensation, lacking dividends payout, among others. On the other hand, shareholders 
in socially-motivated activism are driven by social issues, such as environmental, human 
rights, employee welfare and others. These authors also found that the “exposure” to 
shareholder activism varies by the motivation of the activist, by the nature of the firm and 
by its national context. From a different perspective, Rehbein et al. (2004) highlight that 
shareholder activists are motivated to file resolutions in order to solidify the identity of 
their group. That is, “activists file with corporations to increase the external attention that 
they receive” (Rehbein et al., 2004, p. 262), which can be one of the reasons that lead 
them to prefer larger firms, even when smaller firms exhibit as many issues as larger ones. 
This is simply because larger firms are more visible and more socially exposed (Sjöström, 
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2008). That is to say, activists shareholders may file to pursue their own goals. This 
conclusion is supported by Judge et al. (2010), stating that social activists target relatively 
large and profitable firms, and also by Smith (1996), who concluded that the probability 
of being targeted was positively affected by the level of institutional ownership and firm 
size. 
Following this stream of literature and focusing on the target companies, Rehbein 
et al. (2004) concluded that activist shareholders are submitting social-policy resolutions 
intended for poor corporate performers. These resolutions are aimed at larger companies 
without being affected by their performance concerning stakeholders. When the 
resolutions are product-related, target companies are usually producing products with 
negative contingencies. Therefore, the most common industries that are targeted for 
product-related resolutions are the food, textiles and apparel, the tobacco industry and 
also the forest, paper and publishing industry.  
Concerning environmental-related shareholder resolutions, there is evidence that 
companies and industries with worse environmental performance are likely to be targeted, 
with major focus on oil refining, rubber and plastic, communications and utilities (some 
attention also for forest, paper and publishing) (Rehbein et al., 2004). In contrast, 
industries such as wholesale and retail that evidence a lower incidence of environmental 
problems, were not a preferred target of shareholders with such resolutions. Moreover, 
the findings of Rehbein et al. (2004) indicate that companies with questionable labour 
practices were also targeted, such as firms in the oil refining, rubber and plastic, and hotels 
and entertainment industries. The poor performance of the target companies was also 
supported in a study conducted by Karpoff et al. (1996). The authors confirmed the 
negative relationship between the probability of receiving a proposal and the firm’s 
market-to-book ratio, operating return and recent sales growth. 
Besides these “traditional” motivations behind these never “out-of-fashion” 
resolutions, it is important to recognize that the problems addressed by activist 
shareholders are also dependent and closely related to the issues that are currently 
affecting and changing the society. This is consistent with the belief that issues (and, 
therefore, motivations for activism among shareholders) can follow different patterns 
over time. Some issues arise (and die) abruptly, while others remain of substantial interest 
without being resolved or disappearing over relatively long periods of time (Graves et al., 
2001). A great example is an environmental crisis and climate change issue that is 
increasingly affecting our daily life and activities. Some companies, especially the ones 
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in the industrial sector, are becoming more aware of the gravity of this situation and so 
are its shareholders. The result is an increasing pressure of shareholders on these firms to 
perform accordingly and to adopt policies that can mitigate the problem. In fact, a study 
conducted by Monks et al. (2004) showed that almost half (45%) of the shareholder 
proposals filed at 81 large United States companies between 2000 and 2003 addressed 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) issues. Also, the same research found that the 
average level of support for both CSR proposals and Corporate Governance proposals 
categories grew over the four years. A real-life example explored by these authors to 
illustrate their conclusions is the case of ExxonMobil. The company, one of the world’s 
largest publicly traded in the oil and gas industry, during the four years of their study, has 
attracted a disproportionate share of CSR resolutions compared to other companies in the 
study, presenting support from its shareholders above average. Therefore, ExxonMobil 
constitutes a relevant example of environmental shareholder activism, helping us 
conclude that “a growing base of Exxon’s shareholders view its management’s stance on 
global warming as a threat to the long-term viability of the company” (Monks et al., 2004, 
p. 326) and use their rights to affect the company’s organizational practices. 
 
2.4 Consequences and Effects 
Activist shareholders’ main goal is to maximize their gains. However, the actual 
question is whether this is likely for all interventions. Also, does the firm benefit from the 
resolutions in terms of performance? Here, the studies developed up to now present some 
conflicting results, both regarding short-term and long-term consequences of shareholder 
activism on target companies. 
Smith (1996) tested whether target firms experienced changes in governance 
structure, shareholder wealth, and operating performance. After comparing operating 
income, operating income/sales and operating income/assets in the periods before and 
after the targeting, the authors highlighted that the targets did not perform significantly 
differently from their respective peers in industries. Thus, there was no statistically 
significant improvement. These findings were divergent from the conclusions regarding 
the stock price reaction to the targeting announcement. There is a significant positive 
stock price reaction for successful targeting events and a significant adverse reaction for 
unsuccessful events (Smith, 1996). However, from an overall perspective, the findings 
pointed that shareholder activism is mainly successful in changing governance structure, 
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which, when fortunate, increases shareholder wealth. Yeh (2017) embraced this 
perspective, but focusing on large shareholders. The author argued that “Resolutions 
initiated by large shareholders have positive impacts on the target firms, which reported 
positive announcement-associated abnormal returns.” (Yeh, 2017, p. 245). 
Furthermore, empirical evidence did not find a significant change in the post-
resolution operating performance except for proposals submitted by large shareholders 
for board election and charter amendment, which evidenced a positive impact on post-
resolution profitability. Also, the firms’ management increased share buyback and 
dividend payout in response to demands by large shareholders. It is also important to 
consider that perhaps the outcome of an activist shareholder intervention depends on the 
external context in which the target firm is included. For instance, in the case of 
environmental issues approached by the investors, Kim and Lyon (2011) findings 
evidenced that institutional investor activism toward climate change can increase 
shareholder value when the external business environment becomes more climate-
conscious. 
These conclusions were contradicted in a study conducted by Karpoff et al. 
(1996), showing that “there is no persuasive evidence that these proposals increase firm 
values, improve operating performance, or influence firm policies” (p. 393). Therefore, 
the results indicated that proposals had little effect on operating returns, share values and 
top management turnover. Likewise, the same conclusions were presented in a study that 
explores the outcomes of one of the most famous and successful activist shareholders, 
Carl Icahn. Venkiteshwaran et al. (2010) found no significant changes in the target 
companies’ profitability, capital spending, stock repurchase and dividend payouts, cash 
balances and leverage. However, comparing to a matched set of firms,  the data in their 
research suggests qualitative improvements in the targets’ return on assets (ROA) and 
cash balances, as well as a decrease in leverage. Regarding stock price, significant share 
price increases for the target companies (of about 10%) were observed around the time 
Icahn discloses his intentions publicly (Venkiteshwaran et al., 2010). 
In another recent perspective (Clifford, 2008), it was found that shareholder 
activism, at least from hedge funds, is associated with positive wealth creation in target 
firms. Also, it was concluded that the firms targeted by activist funds reveal better 
operating performance one year before the block (percentage of the company acquired) 
acquisition than those targeted by passive funds. These hedge funds also seem to earn 
greater investment returns from their active blocks rather than their passive ones. Gillan 
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and Starks (2000) agree with this perspective, arguing that activism of institutional 
investors and coordinated groups appeared to have slightly more success, as well as 
Venkiteshwaran et al. (2010) and Denes et al. (2017). These authors found that Carl Icahn, 
the founder of one of the most famous activist hedge funds, “attained at least partial 
success in almost 60% of his large investments.” (p. 55).  The conclusion that hedge funds 
targets earn, on average, higher abnormal stock returns during the period surrounding the 
initial Schedule 13D filing comparing to other activist targets was presented by Klein and 
Zur (2009). The authors also highlight the distinction between the demands made on 
target firms by hedge fund activists and by the other activist investors. According to Klein 
and Zur (2009), “Hedge funds address the free cash flow problem by frequently 
demanding the target firm to buy back its own shares, cut the CEO’s salary, and initiate 
dividends. In the fiscal year after the initial 13D filing, hedge fund targets, on average, 
double their dividends, significantly increase their long-term debt, and significantly 
decrease their cash and short-term investments. In contrast, other activists most frequently 
demand changes in operating strategies.” (p. 226). Given these requests, one can conclude 
that significant differences in changes in research and development (R&D) and capital 
expenditures in the year following the 13D filing may emerge between targets of hedge 
funds and other activists.  
Embracing the theory of two distinct motivations behind shareholder activism 
(financially-motivated and socially-motivated activism), Judge et al. (2010) presented 
interesting results that differed according to the type of motivation. For instance, 
regarding financial activism, firm size showed no relationship and the firm’s profitability 
evidenced a negative relationship. Nevertheless, both variables presented a positive 
relationship with social activism. Ownership concentration, however, was negatively 
related to both financial and social activism.  
Furthermore, there are some results (although not conclusive) regarding the 
relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firms’ profitability, which 
is directly associated with activist shareholders intervention, if the proposals are related 
to CSR issues. McWilliams and Siegel (2000) highlighted the connection between CSR 
and R&D, as both are associated with product and process innovation. In an equation 
where both intensities (R&D and CSR) are considered, CSR presented a neutral effect on 
profitability. Given that, from previous studies, R&D was proven to be positively 
correlated with firm profitability, and considering the high correlation with CSR, one can 
conclude that, indirectly, CSR has a positive impact on profitability. Nevertheless, it is 
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difficult to isolate the impact of CSR on profitability without simultaneous control for 
R&D.  
Finally, there are conflicting conclusions concerning firms’ performance. There is 
literature that supports both a positive (Smith, 1996; Yeh, 2017; Clifford, 2008; Gillan & 
Starks, 2000) and a non-significant effect on firms’ performance (Karpoff et al., 1996). 
For instance, David et al. (2007) found a negative relationship between shareholders’ 
proposals and subsequent corporate social performance (CSP), suggesting a signalling 
effect rather than a disciplining one. That is, instead of pressuring firms to improve CSP, 
activism may simply cause the diversion of resources into political activities used by 
managers in order to retain discretion and resist external pressures. Moreover, according 
to the same research, the settlement with salient shareholders also reduces CSP, 
“suggesting that managers’ responses are symbolic; i.e., they settle with salient 
shareholders to demonstrate conformance but continue to resist making the substantive 
changes to core policies that may compromise their discretion” (p. 91). On the contrary, 
and focusing on an environmental perspective, Lee and Lounsbury (2011) concluded that 
environmental shareholder resolutions had a significant and positive causal effect on the 
targeted firms’ environmental performance, highlighting the fact that social shareholder 
activists appear to have a strong influence on corporate behaviour. 
 
3. Hypothesis and Explanatory Variables 
To study and understand the influence of activism in our dependent variables, it 
is crucial to explore different independent variables based on the main conclusions drawn 
from the papers analysed. It is also necessary to formulate hypotheses that reflect the 
expected relationships between the dependent and independent variables obtained in the 
empirical analysis. 
Hypothesis 1: Performance is positively related to the entry of activists in firms’ 
shareholder structure. 
With the majority of the papers presented supporting a positive relationship 
between the intervention of an activist investor and the target firms’ performance (Smith, 
1996; Yeh, 2017; Clifford, 2008; Gillan & Starks, 2000; Venkiteshwaran et al., 2010), 
we decided to formulate our base hypothesis in these findings. Furthermore, these 
shareholders’ intervention is intended to change the companies’ management path, by 
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contributing with new ideias and new processes that can improve operations and enhance 
shareholder value. 
Hypothesis 2: Performance is positively related to the entry of activists in firms’ 
shareholder structure in years after the campaign. 
Here we assume that the relationship between the companies’ performance and 
the presence of the activist shareholder becomes more positive through the years. This is 
mainly because, in the first year or two, the companies might still be adapting to changes 
in their organizational environments, but after a few years the changes will become more 
positive as the firms start to regain their balance. 
Hypothesis 3: Liquidity is positively related with the firms’ performance, after the 
activist investors’ intervention. 
Here, we are including a variable that was not considered in the papers presented 
in the Literature Review section: the companies’ liquidity. In this last hypothesis, we 
assume that the firms’ management efficiency concerning their short-term liabilities is 
positively affected by the presence of the activist investor. 
In general, with the hypothesis formulated for this study, we assume that the entry 
of an activist shareholder in the target firms’ investor structure has a positively growing 
impact in these target firms’ performance, either in the short-term or in the long-term. 
The entry of activist shareholders is in our study captured by the variable Dt  - a 
dummy variable that represents the year in which an activist campaign for the target 
company is announced, being equal to one if the year is the campaign year and zero 
otherwise. This is the year in which we assume that the influence of the activist investor 
in the target firm begins. Therefore, D1, D2 and D3 are, respectively, Dt+1, Dt+2 and Dt+3. 
That is to say, one, two and three years after the announcement year for the campaign. 
However, we focused our analysis in the variable D_, which represents the cumulative 
information contained in the years from D (year of the announcement of the activist 
campaign) to the last year of available information for a specific company. This is also a 
dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the year is D and onwards, and zero otherwise. 
Additionally, we opted to include the cumulative information of the three years 
after the announcement year, originating D_1, D_2 and D_3 dummy variables, as to study 
if the cumulative information up to a specific year can be more, less or equally 
significative as the information of the year itself. 
 




4.1 Data and Sample Selection 
Data on shareholder activism is very scarce, which justifies the still small number 
of studies on this topic. Our data on activist shareholders’ proposals were collected from 
“Corporate Governance Market Overview”, a Thomson Reuters Eikon’s subsection. The 
data obtained included essentially information about the activist shareholders’ campaigns, 
such as the announcement date, the activist shareholder responsible for the proposal, the 
company targeted, the current status of the proposal, the specific demands of the investor 
and numerous other sections. This database included a total of  4,718 campaigns. The 
data was cross-checked to ensure reliability. 
Next, we collected financial data for the target from Thomson Reuters Eikon. 
Despite the relevant number of observations from the activist investors’ database, the 
ISIN code was not available for target companies. A manual match was performed 
between the name of the target companies against the entire list of companies covered in 
Thomson Reuters. Subsequently, the financial data was collected for these companies. 
The final sample comprised 884 target firms and respective first campaigns from activist 
investors. 
Our final sample included firms from 35 different countries, with the United States 
leading the list with a considerable difference, given that this is where it was introduced 
the rule that pioneered the world of shareholder activism. Canada and the United 
Kingdom constitute the top two and three countries with the highest number of proposals, 
respectively. In Figure 1 is possible to analyse the top ten of the target firms’ nations, 
where the previously referred countries occupy the podium of the list. Regarding the 
industries of the target companies, Oil and Gas Exploration and Production is the industry 
with the highest number of target companies, perhaps because this is one of the industries 
where more issues regarding climate change and environmental concerns arise and, 
consequently, caught activist shareholders’ attention. This industry is immediately 
followed by IT Services and Consulting and by Software industries (Figure 2). Finally, 
2017 was the year with the higher number of activist investor entries in target companies 
in our final dataset, with a total of 166 proposals, being followed by 2015 and 2016, with 
152 and 119 proposals, respectively (Figure 3). This confirms that shareholder activism 
is on the rise, with the number of proposals submitted increasing year by year. 
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It is noteworthy to refer that, in this research, we only considered the first 
campaign for each company. This is simply because in our database there were numerous 
cases where, for the same company, there was more than one campaign submitted 
throughout the years. We opted to only consider the first occurrence in these cases, that 
is, the first moment when an activist starts to be part of the firms’ shareholder structure. 
 
4.2 Dependent variables 
To study the target companies’ financial performance given the intervention of an 
activist investor, we use Return on Equity – ROE – and Return on Assets – ROA – as the 
dependent variables. 
ROE is calculated by dividing earnings per share by the book value per share. 
Being expressed as a percentage, ROE measures how effectively management is returning 
to equity financiers. Besides being a measure of profit, it is also a measure of efficiency, 
since a rising ROE indicates that a company is increasing its ability to generate profit 
without needing as much capital. After generating and consulting the histogram for ROE, 
possible outliers were observed. As to diminish the influence of these outliers, we decided 
to apply the winsorization technique in the dependent variable, originating the final 
version of ROE  (Figure 4). This method represents an effective way to deal with potential 
outliers by assigning them a lower weight instead of removing them. Therefore, it helps 
to improve statistical efficiency and to increase the robustness of statistical inferences, 
without losing data. 
ROA is estimated by dividing net income by total assets and, similarly to ROE, is 
expressed as a percentage. This variable can reflect how efficiently management is using 
its assets to generate earnings and, therefore, it is also a measure of efficiency. 
Comparing both dependent variables, one can conclude that these are measures of 
how a company utilises its resources and that these variables “complete” one another. 
They diverge on capital structure decisions. That is, ROE only reflects the return on the 
company’s equity, not considering the liabilities, whereas ROA accounts for the 
company’s debt. Thus, by considering both variables we can study the impact of the 
shareholders’ intervention in the companies’ financial performance.  
Although these were not dependent variables already studied in the papers 
analysed for this dissertation, we opted to explore both of them, since these are rather 
simple and practical variables to obtain and interpret. 




4.3 Regression Model 
For this research, we decided to perform a panel data analysis due to several 
reasons. Firstly, given that it constitutes a combination of cross-section and time-series 
data, it provides more data variation, less collinearity and more degrees of freedom. Also, 
it is a better-suited method to understand the dynamics of change and transition 
behaviours, which is essentially the core of our research: to investigate the effects of 
shareholder activism in target companies and their influence on these targets' 
organisational environments. Finally, panel data is better in detecting and measuring the 
effects which cannot be observed in either cross-section or time-series data. 
Regarding the static methods, a vast diversity of models was used in the literature 
exposed in this dissertation, from Fixed Effects (FE) (Lee and Lounsbury, 2011), 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) (Rehbein et al., 2004), Probit (Smith, 1996) and Logit 
(Rehbein et al., 2004). 
As a result of this brief analysis, we were ready to formulate the generic regression 
models, as follows: 
 
(1) ROE = β0 + β1D_ + β2ln_assets it + β3debt_equityit  
+  β4gross_marginit  + β5liquidity + εit 
 
(2) ROA = β0 + β1D_ + β2ln_assetsit + β3debt_equityit  
+  β4gross_marginit  + β5liquidityit + εit 
 
Where ROE and ROA are the dependent variables as defined in the previous 
chapter. 
Ln_assets represents the logarithm of the total assets of each target firm. We opted 
to include this variable in the model as a way to account for the firm size. A positive 
relationship with ROA is expected, as activist shareholders tend to target larger firms 
(Judge et al., 2010; Smith, 1996). 
Debt_equity represents the leverage of the target company, constituting an 
interesting variable to study and relate to shareholder activism, as to analyse whether 
target firms are more prone to debt financing or not. A negative relationship with ROA is 
expected, as the higher the firms’ leverage, the lower the respective rentability. 
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Gross_margin was included in the base model as it represents the gross profit of 
each company after accounting for the costs of goods sold and it is the starting point 
towards achieving a healthy net profit. It can be a measure of efficiency, as the higher the 
gross margin, the more capital a company retains on each dollar of sales. Therefore, a 
positive relationship with ROA and ROE is expected. 
Liquidity is measured by the current ratio (current assets divided by current 
liabilities) and indicates how easily the firms can meet its short-term financial obligations. 
That is, it translates the company’s efficiency in using short-term assets to cover its short-
term liabilities. This independent variable was not present in any of the studies considered 
in the Literature Review section. Nevertheless, we opted to include this variable as a way 
to analyse if, after the intervention of the activist shareholders, the company can still 
efficiently manage its short-term liabilities. 
Before the formulation of the aforementioned generic regression models and in 
order to choose the ideal method for our research, one should understand the inherent 
implications of each model and apply the suitable tests to support the decision. Therefore, 
the following tests were performed in both dependent variables: ROE and ROA. 
The Ramsey test can be applied in order to test for a possible problem of the 
omitted variables in our research. After Ramsey test was performed, a p-value of 0.000 
was obtained for both dependent variables, revealing a possible issue of omitted variables 
in our model. This result was not a surprise, given the fact that, due to data availability, 
the majority of the variables referred in the Literature Review section were not possible 
to obtain. 
Additionally, as to choose between FE and Random Effects (RE), the Hausmann 
test was performed, obtaining, once again, a p-value of 0.000 for both ROE and ROA, 
indicating that FE estimator was the optimal choice for our model. 
After the definition of our base equations and variables and before proceeding to 
its respective results, an additional previous analysis is required, namely to the dependent 
and independent variables, to the descriptive statistics and to the correlation matrix. 
The first test and adjustment were performed on the dependent variables, ROE 
and ROA. In this analysis we studied the normality of the residuals of these variables and, 
considering the great number of outliers, we adjusted the residuals by dropping 
observations below 5% and above 95%. The results obtained after the adjustment were 
far more optimistic, showing by Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8, demonstrating the scenario after 
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the exclusion of the outliers for ROE and ROA, respectively. Afterwards, we were able 
to proceed with the tests. 
The next step was to test the independent variables regarding heteroskedasticity 
and multicollinearity. 
The search for potential correlation among the explanatory variables constitutes a 
core element of this research, since it uncovers the problem of multicollinearity, which 
refers to predictors that are correlated with other predictors. Mostly, it results from 
redundancy among the explanatory variables. The main concern about the presence of 
multicollinearity in our model is the fact that, with multicollinearity, the standard errors 
of the coefficients are increased. As a result, coefficients for some independent variables 
may be found not to be significantly different from 0, meaning that, by overinflating the 
standard errors, multicollinearity makes some variables statistically insignificant when 
they should be significant. Thus, by detecting and posteriorly correcting this issue, the 
standard errors remain lower and the coefficients might be significant. 
In Table 1 are displayed the results obtained regarding the levels of correlation 
between the explanatory variables. The fact that there are no correlation levels below -0.6 
or above 0.6 evidences the absence of multicollinearity and, consequently, the value of 
the coefficients and the interpretation of our independent variables are not at risk 
considering the chosen models. 
Then, we tested for the presence of heteroskedasticity, which occurs when the 
standard errors of a variable, monitored over a specific amount of time, are non-constant. 
It is important to correct possible heteroskedasticity because, although it does not cause 
any bias in the estimation, it can be the origin of less precision in the estimation. 
Consequently, lower precision increases the likelihood that the coefficient estimates are 
further from the correct value. For the disclosure of this issue, two tests were performed: 
Shapiro-Wilk test and Wald test. For both regressions (1) and (2) these tests were positive 
for the presence of heteroskedasticity among variables and both presented a p-value equal 
to zero, rejecting the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. In order to correct this issue, 
we included robust standard errors in our regressions. 
Another useful preliminary analysis is to observe the descriptive statistics for the 
dependent and independent variables in question and seek to interpret these values, which 
are displayed in Table 2. 
An additional interesting observation is that the majority of the standard 
deviations for the variables is higher than the respective mean, which indicates that most 
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of the observations are farther to the mean and, therefore, the volatility implied is higher. 
Concerning ln_assets, with a standard deviation lower than the respective mean, one can 
conclude that the values for these variables are closer to the mean and are, consequently, 
less volatile. 
Focusing on leverage, the debt_equity ratio presents a mean equal to 
approximately 70%, suggesting that the target companies have preferred to finance their 
growth through borrowing, which indicates a higher risk in financing. This high 
percentage supports the belief that activist shareholders seek target companies with poor 
financial performance (Rehbein et al., 2004). 
 
5. Results 
 To answer this dissertation’s research question of “What is the impact of activist 
shareholders’ intervention on the target firms’ performance?”, the defined regressions in 
the previous section were tested and the respective results are presented in this chapter. 
 
5.1 Estimation Results 
The Panel data used is considered unbalanced, since the years with available data 
for each target company are not the same for every company. Inevitably, the years range 
varies from 1988 to 2019 but with gaps, which originates an unbalanced Panel data. As 
to avoid selection bias, we opted to proceed with the research using the current Panel data, 
instead of adapting and excluding observations with the purpose of making it balanced. 
According to the results obtained with the regression analysis, the years 
subsequent to the activist shareholder intervention are statistically significant but 
evidence a negative impact on the companies’ performance, contradicting our base 
hypothesis. The results are displayed in Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 corresponding to Panels I, II, 
III and IV, respectively. 
With respect to the results achieved for the ROE regression, the global effect of 
the activists intervention in the companies’ organizational practices is significant and 
negative, with this impact being more prominent until the end of the first year after the 
activist campaign announcement (Table 3). This negative relationship between the firms’ 
performance and the shareholder activism can derive from the fact that, by becoming a 
target of these shareholders and engaging in a rather polemic campaign in the eyes of the 
public, these target companies’ reputation can be negatively affected, and, consequently, 
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their return and profitability may diminish in the subsequent years. This is mostly 
because, as it was evidenced in the studies conducted by Karpoff et al. (1996) and by 
Rehbein et al. (2004), the companies become targets of shareholder activism when their 
performance in a given organizational area is weak, which can diminish their credibility 
and prestige in the eyes of the public. Additionally, the companies’ restructuring process 
after the activist intervention can also constitute a reason for the negative relationship 
revealed in the results obtained. Essentially, the restructuring of the firms can be a 
complex, tense and unstable process and, understandably, can affect the companies’ 
activity and financial performance. 
Regarding ROA, by analysing Table 4, the results obtained were similar to the 
ones concerning ROE. Thus, the interpretation is the same as the previously presented. 
Furthermore, for both ROE and ROA, the coefficient for the years following the 
targeting (D1, D2 and D3) becomes less negative throughout the years, but it also 
becomes less significant (Table 3 and Table 4). Thus, our second hypothesis is 
contradicted. According to our results, the impact of shareholder activism in firm 
performance is negative and with higher significance until the end of the first year (D1). 
In D2 the impact is negative but less significant that D1 and finally in D3 the impact is 
not significant. 
In order to test our third and final hypothesis, an interaction between liquidity and 
the lagged years (D_, D1, D2 and D3) was included in the model and tested towards both 
ROE and ROA. Liquidity, contradicting our third hypothesis, was not statistically 
significant towards both ROE and ROA during the years that followed the announcement 
date, namely D_, D1 and D2, as it can be observed in Tables 5 and 6. However, it revealed 
to be positive and significant in the third year (D3) after the targeting. Therefore, in a 
general perspective, there is no evidence that shareholder activism has a considerable 
impact in firms’ efficiency and ability to meet their short-term liabilities. 
Finally, a highlight for the positive relationship between gross margin and both 
ROE and ROA (Table 3 and Table 4), which was expected, as higher efficiency in 
management of the assets and the financing provided (ROA and ROE) can be reflected 
in a higher revenue after considering all costs (gross margin). Additionally, the firms’ 
size was statistically significant towards ROE for the years that followed the targeting, 
but the results revealed no significance towards ROA, contradicting the initial 
expectations. 
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6. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research 
The aim of this dissertation is to study the potential influence of shareholder 
activism on firm performance and thus contribute to the current debate that did not reach 
a broad understanding. The analysis was performed considering companies that were 
targeted by activist investors through campaigns between the years 1988 to 2019, 
covering up to 884 companies. 
A dummy variable was included in the model, representing the subsequent years 
after the announcement date of an activist campaign for a specific target company. The 
joint effect of these years was included in the base equation of the models and tested. 
Surprisingly, the results obtained in the estimation evidenced a significant and negative 
effect of the activism for the years following the campaign announcement, especially until 
the end of the first consecutive year. These findings helped us conclude that, as the years 
after the announcement goes by, the effect of shareholder activism has a negative impact 
on the target companies’ performance, contradicting our base hypothesis. Moreover, as 
the  years following the entry of the activist investor were found to be negative and with 
a decreasing statistical significance, our second hypothesis was contradicted as well. 
Liquidity turned out to be not statistically significant in the generality of the years 
following the targeting, therefore contradicting our third and final hypothesis. 
Given the rise of activist investment in the modern business world, it is crucial to 
explore its impact in the target companies’ practices and reach conclusions that can help 
us understand these shareholders’ intentions and repercussions. Thus, with all the 
conclusions reached in this study, we were able to contribute, with solid results regarding 
firm performance after the targeting, to the existent research in this somewhat unexplored 
but truly contemporary field that is the shareholder activism.  
Despite this dissertation allowed us to reach interesting conclusions, there are still 
some limitations that conditioned the course of this research, such as the availability and 
consistency of data regarding shareholder activism. The data collected involving the 
activism campaigns presented serious gaps and the absence of an ISIN code in the 
database obligated the exclusion of a great number of campaigns, simply because the 
ISIN code was crucial to obtain the firms’ financial data. Also, it is considerably 
challenging to measure the effects of shareholder activism directly, since there plenty 
variables that influence these activists’ intervention in a company’s organizational 
Joana Santos The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Firm Performance 
19 
 
environment, such as the type of proposal, the outcome, the number of years these 
activists remain aggregated to the company, and numerous others. 
In conclusion, and considering the limitations in our research, a favourable future 
approach could take into account all these variables that were not controlled in our model, 
a greater span of years after and before the activist involvement and perhaps even a 
control goup of peer companies that were not targeted by activist shareholders. Another 
interesting suggestion would be to switch the dependent variables with the years’ dummy 
variable, as to study the impact of the firm performance in the activist intervention timing. 
That is, to analyse the companies’ financial performance by the time of the activist 
campaign proposal and to test the conclusions presented by notable authors in prominent 
papers in this field of study, such as Karpoff et al. (1996) and Rehbein et al. (2004).  
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Figure 1: Top Ten Target Firms’ Nations 






Figure 2: Top Ten Target Companies’ Industries 
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Figures 5 and 6: Residual’s Analysis after the adjustment for ROE 
Figure 5 presents the Kernel density estimation for ROE against the normal density after the respective adjustment. 





Figures 7 and 8: Residual’s Analysis after the adjustment for ROA 
Figure 7 presents the Kernel density estimation for ROA against the normal density after the respective adjustment. 
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix 
Table 1 presents the correlation matrix of the independent variables. Here, the correlation coefficients are shown and 
represent the strength and direction (positive or negative) of the linear relationship between each of these variables, 
which are characterized as described in chapter 4.3. 
  D_ Assets D/E Gross Margin Liquidity 
D_ 1.0000     
Assets 0.0612* 1.0000    
D/E 0.0047 0.0853* 1.0000   
Gross Margin -0.0035 0.0011 0.0064 1.0000  
Liquidity -0.0055 -0.1951* -0.0309* 0.0520* 1.0000 
 






Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 depicts the basic descriptive statistics of both dependent and independent variables to test in the regression 
analysis. Dependent variables are ROE and ROA. Independent variables are characterized as described in chapter 4.3. 
Variable Std. Dev. 1st Quartile Mean 3rd Quartile 
ROE 0.1693 -0.125 0.0565 0.1556 
ROA 0.0991 -0.4993 0.2135 0.04589 
D_ 0.4468 0.0000 0.2756 1.0000 
Assets 2.7153 18.5335 20.4029 22.0662 
D/E 4.1252 0.0234 0.6872 0.9007 
Gross Margin 0.4138 0.2318 0.4063 0.5605 
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Table 3: Panel I 
Table 3 presents the results for the regression model considering ROE as dependent variable, presented in the 
Methodology section. The independent variables are characterized as described in chapter 4.3. and this Panel considers 
fixed effects. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE 
D_all -0.0198***     
 (0.005)     
ln_assets -0.0027 -0.0048** -0.0052** -0.0055** -0.0057** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
debt_equity -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
gross_margin 0.0302* 0.0300* 0.0301* 0.0301* 0.0301* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Liquidity 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
D  -0.0354***    
  (0.006)    
D1   -0.0238***   
   (0.006)   
D2    -0.0154**  
    (0.007)  
D3     -0.0057 
     (0.008) 
Constant 0.1075** 0.1468*** 0.1529*** 0.1582*** 0.1621*** 
 (0.052) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
      
Fixed Effects:      
Company Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 13674 13674 13674 13674 13674 
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.006 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4: Panel II 
Table 4 presents the results for the regression model considering ROA as dependent variable, presented in the 
Methodology section. The independent variables are characterized as described in chapter 4.3. and this Panel considers 
fixed effects. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables ROA  ROA ROA ROA ROA 
D_all -0.0114***     
 (0.003)     
ln_assets 0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0013 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
debt_equity -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
gross_margin 0.0218* 0.0217* 0.0217* 0.0217* 0.0217* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Liquidity 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
D  -0.0201***    
  (0.003)    
D1   -0.0144***   
   (0.003)   
D2    -0.0076*  
    (0.004)  
D3     -0.0009 
     (0.004) 
Constant 0.0092 0.0318 0.0349 0.0387 0.0412 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
      
Fixed Effects:      
Company Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 13674 13674 13674 13674 13674 
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 5: Panel III 
Table 5 presents the results for the regression model considering ROE as dependent variable. The independent variables 
are characterized as described in chapter 4.3. except for liquidity. Here, liquidity is replaced by the interaction between 
liquidity and the lagged year (D_, D1, D2 and D3), as to study the impact of the activist investors’ intervention in the 
companies’ liquidity. This Panel considers fixed effects. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables ROE ROE ROE ROE 
D_ -0.0214***    
 (0.005)    
Liquidity * D_ 0.0006    
 (0.001)    
ln_assets -0.0028 -0.0053** -0.0056** -0.0058** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
debt_equity -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
gross_margin 0.0301* 0.0300* 0.0300* 0.0300* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
D1  -0.0277***   
  (0.008)   
liquidity_D1  0.0016   
  (0.001)   
D2   -0.0152*  
   (0.008)  
liquidity_D2   -0.0001  
   (0.001)  
D3    -0.0098 
    (0.008) 
liquidity_D3    0.0014** 
    (0.001) 
Constant 0.1108** 0.1569*** 0.1625*** 0.1659*** 
 (0.052) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) 
     
Fixed Effects:     
Company Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 13674 13674 13674 13674 
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.006 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 6: Panel IV 
Table 6 presents the results for the regression model considering ROA as dependent variable The independent variables 
are characterized as described in chapter 4.3. except for liquidity. Here, liquidity is replaced by the interaction between 
liquidity and the lagged year (D_, D1, D2 and D3), as to study the impact of the activist investors’ intervention in the 
companies’ liquidity. This Panel considers fixed effects. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA 
D_ -0.0127***    
 (0.003)    
Liquidity * D_ 0.0005    
 (0.000)    
ln_assets 0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0014 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
debt_equity -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
gross_margin 0.0218* 0.0217* 0.0218* 0.0218* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
D1  -0.0155***   
  (0.004)   
liquidity_D1  0.0005   
  (0.001)   
D2   -0.0078*  
   (0.004)  
liquidity_D2   0.0000  
   (0.001)  
D3    -0.0056 
    (0.004) 
liquidity_D3    0.0016** 
    (0.001) 
Constant 0.0108 0.0374 0.0413 0.0433 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
     
Fixed Effects:     
Company Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 13674 13674 13674 13674 
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.009 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Source: Author 
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Table 7: Theoretical Papers 
Table 5 presents information concerning the theoretical papers that were analysed and presented in the Literature Review section of this dissertation. The information regarding the papers is 
organised as follows: author and year of the publishing, the topic of the paper, the type of analysis/methodology and the main conclusions reached. 




Author (year) Topic Paper Type of Analysis Main Conclusions 
Emma Sjöström (2008) 
 
Shareholder Activism for 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Analysis of the existing literature 
regarding shareholder activism for 
corporate social and environmental 
responsibility.  
• Religious groups have consistently been the most active filers of environmentally and socially focused 
shareholder proposals in the US, with individuals and public pension funds being the other active groups. 
• The issues forwarded through these proposals vary over time, and proposals tend to receive a minority vote, 
with a mean less than 10% and with highs not over 20%. 
• Targets for shareholder activism tend to be large and well-known corporations, due to their visibility and their 
relation to critical environmental and social issues. 
• It is debated whether shareholder activism can successfully change corporate behaviour, with several studies 
leaning towards a sceptical approach that such activism lacks the power for corporate change, and warning 
that it can only achieve modest and corporate-specific changes rather than more fundamental and industry-
wide change. 
• NGO shareholder activism is on the rise, as is union shareholder activism (at least in Australia). 
• Authors are positive towards the role that pension funds can play in influencing corporate social and 
environmental responsibility. 
• Insights into various country-specific issues, such as the effects on shareholder activism from regulatory 




Shareholder activism for 




Analysis of historical perspective on 
the growth and spread of shareholder 
activism, of the key actors involved 
in this activity, of CSR issues being 
raised, of the process of resolutions 
and dialogue. 
• Shareholder activism is a valuable tool to activists wishing to shift companies towards CSR because it opens 
up the debate on CSR issues to a broader audience. 
• The shareholder activist community currently seems to need a dedicated research effort to establish firm 
connections between CSR and core business issues in order to bring more shareholders on board. 
Jeanne M. Logsdon and 
Harry J. Van Buren III 
(2009) 
Dialogues between shareholder 
activists and corporations 
This article contributes both 
theoretically and empirically to the 
study of Dialogues between 
shareholder activists and 
corporations. 
• Exclusive focus on public actions – like the filing of shareholder resolutions and the focus on votes at the 
annual meeting – understates the impact of shareholder activism. It is through Dialogue that the most 
substantive achievements occur. 
• When a resolution is withdrawn after an agreement is reached between the company and the resolution’s 
proponents, or a resolution is not filed on an issue for several years because of an ongoing  Dialogue, the 
impact of this form of shareholder activism is out of the public view and much more difficult to analyse. 
• Ultimately by developing stronger and more trusting relationships, the Dialogue process should provide 
greater opportunities for participants to achieve their individual goals by addressing critical social issues 
through collaboration. 
Terrence Guay, Jonathan P. 




Activism, and Socially 
The goal is to document the growing 
influence of non-governmental 
• NGO shareholder activism constitutes a direct challenge to boards and managers and draws attention to 
shareholder demand. 




Ethical, Strategic, and 
Governance Implications 
(NOGs) in the realm of socially 
responsible investing (SRI). 
 
• NGOs are beginning to initiate socially responsible investing funds. 
• NGOs have other tools to influence corporate behaviour. Some, such as working with firms to devise labour 
and environmental codes of conduct, are more cooperative in nature than is SRI. 
• NGOs have grown and matured, both as individual organizations and on a collective level, so they have come 
to occupy an important and influential position in corporate governance and in society. 
Stuart L. Gillan,  Laura T. 
Starks (2007) 
The Evolution of Shareholder 
Activism in the United States 
The goal is to review the evolution of 
shareholder activism since the 
establishment of the SEC in the 
1930s, with emphasis on three main 
subjects: the kinds of companies that 
are targeted by activists, the motives 
of institutional investors for activism 
and the effectiveness of activists in 
bringing about economically 
significant change at targeted 
companies. There is also an analysis 
of the most recent changes that have 
occurred with the entry of hedge 
funds into shareholder activism. 
• The main motive for active participation by institutional investors in the monitoring of corporations has been 
the potential to enhance the value of their investments. 
• The evidence provided by empirical studies of the effects of shareholder activism is mixed: there is evidence 
of positive short-term market reactions to announcements of certain kinds of activism whereas there is little 
evidence of improvement in the long-term operating or stock-market performance of the targeted companies. 
• The recent entrance of hedge funds into shareholder activism has provided more evidence of gains from 
activism, but the long-term effects are still unknown and warrant more research. 
• Also, there are significant changes in the business activities of companies targeted by shareholder initiatives, 
but it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between shareholder activism and these changes. 
Matthew R. Denes, Jonathan 
M. Karpoff, Victoria B. 
McWilliams (2017) 
Thirty years of shareholder 
activism: A survey of empirical 
research 
The goal is to summarize and 
synthesize the results from 73 studies 
that examine the consequences of 
shareholder activism for targeted 
firms and draw the primary 
conclusions. 
• Activism that adopts some of the investment-intensive aspects of corporate takeovers, such as hedge fund 
activism, is associated with improvements in target firms’ values and operations. 
• Studies of shareholder activism that draw from recent samples reveal more evidence of improvements in target 
firms’ values and operations than earlier studies that are based on activism from 1980s and 1990s, which 
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Table 8: Empirical Papers 
Table 6 depicts the essential information concerning the papers of empirical nature presented and discussed in the Literature Review of this dissertation. The information regarding the papers is 
organised as follows: author and year of the publishing, the region of the sample analysed in the study, the period of sample, the type of analysis/methodology adopted, the dependent variables 
and independent variables studied and the main conclusions reached. 
Notes: CG stands for Corporate Governance; BIR stands for Benzene internalization rate (BIR); ROA refers to Return on Assets; CSR refers to Corporate Social Responsibility; IRRC stands for 
Investor Responsibility Research Center; CDP refers to Carbon Disclosure Project. 
Name, Author (Year) Region/Country Period Methodology Dependent Variable Independent Variables Main Conclusions 
“Shareholder activism on 
environmental issues: A 
study of proposals at large 
US corporations (2000–
2003)” 
Robert Monks, Antony 







USA 2000-2003 Analysis of shareholder proposals of a 
group of 81 US corporations over a 
four-year period. The companies in the 
study were selected from a database of 
100 of the largest publicly listed US 
companies. 
 
Type of shareholder 
proposal 
- • A large portion (45%) of shareholder proposals 
filed at 81 large US companies from 2000 to 
2003 addressed CSR issues. 
• Average level of support for both CSR proposals 
and CG proposals categories grew over the four-
year period. 
• Proposals dealing with environmental issues (in 
particular, climate change), tended to attain the 
highest level of shareholder support of the CSR-
oriented proposals and showed a rate of growth 
in support similar to that of CG-oriented 
resolutions. 
• In the ExxonMobil case was found that a 
majority of the shareholder proposals concerned 
CSR-oriented issues. 
• Regulatory changes that generally improve 
shareholder rights and increase shareholder 
participation in the proxy voting process will 
benefit CSR activism within corporations. 
“Domesticating Radical Rant 
and Rage:  An Exploration 
of the Consequences of 
Environmental Shareholder 
Resolutions on Corporate 
Environmental Performance” 
Min-Dong Paul Lee and 
Michael Lounsbury (2011) 
USA 1993-2005 Panel data and fixed effect regression 




(BIR), which is a 
standardized measure 
of benzene waste 
management practice 
at the facility level 
Level of environmental 
shareholder activism, lagged 
variable of the previous one, 
firm age, revenue, petroleum 
industry, foreign ownership, 
state exposure, 
environmental resolutions 
• Environmental shareholder resolutions had a 
significant and positive causal effect on the 
targeted firms’ environmental performance. 
• Social shareholder activists have strong 
influence on corporate behaviour. 
• The findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
that larger firms and firms in industries that are 
closer to end-users are more likely to respond 
positively to socially oriented shareholder 
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Corporations Are Targeted?” 
Kathleen Rehbein, Sandra 
Waddok and Samuel B. 
Graves (2004) 
USA 1991-1998 Stakeholder performance variables 
were taken from the social research 
firm Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini’s 
(KLD) Socrates database, for the 
period of 1991 to 1998. 







Employee relations (and 
diversity management), 
community, product (a 
customer surrogate), and 
environment 
• Shareholder activists are motivated by interest- 
and identity-based rationales. 
• Shareholder activists are submitting some 
social-policy resolutions with the intent of 
altering the social behaviour of poor corporate 
performers. 
• Some social-policy shareholder resolutions are 
aimed at the largest companies only. 
• Shareholder activists submit more product-
related resolutions with corporations that have 
produced products that have negative 
contingencies. 
• The relationship between environmental 
performance and targeting of environment-
related shareholder resolutions is strongly 
supported, indicating that companies and 
industries with worse environmental 
performance are targets. 
• In some industries, shareholder activists will file 
resolutions with companies that have 
questionable labour practices. 
• Interest-based factors motivate shareholder 
activists to file social policy resolutions. 
• Shareholder activists are motivated to file 
resolutions to solidify the identity of their group. 
• Activists filed social-policy resolutions with 
companies that are more progressive with 
diversity practices. 
• Shareholder activists were more likely to file 
shareholder resolutions with companies that 
have relatively good community relationships. 
“Investor Activism, 
Managerial Responsiveness 
and Corporate Social 
Performance” 
Parthiban David, Matt 
Bloom, Amy J. Hillman 
(2007) 
Not specified 1992-1998 Data was collected from IRRC 
(shareholder activism), KLD (CSP 





ownership, activism from 
stakeholders, shareholder 
group affiliation, CSP 
industry CSP, sales, ROA 
• Negative relationship between shareholder 
proposals and subsequent CSP, suggesting 
support for signaling rather than disciplining 
effect of activism. Rather than pressuring firms 
to improve CSP, activism may merely engender 
diversion of resources away from CSP into 
political activities used by managers to resist 
external pressures and retain discretion. 
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• Managers are more likely to settle proposals 
filed by salient shareholders. 
• CSP declines even when firms settle with salient 
shareholders. 
“Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Financial 
Performance: Correlation or 
Misspecification?” 
Abagail McWilliams, 
Donald Siegel (2000) 
USA 1991-1996 Data collected from KLD (CSP)   PERF (financial 
performance) 
CSP (Corporate Social 
Performance), RDINT (R&D 
to sales ratio), Industry 
Dummys, size, risk, 
advertising intensity 
• Empirical evidence shows that investment in 
R&D has a strong positive impact on 
profitability. 
• Results confirm that CSP and R&D are highly 
correlated, and that, when R&D intensity is 
included in the equation, CSP is shown to have a 
neutral effect on profitability. 
• Models that claim to “explain” firm 
performance, but do not include important 
strategic variables, such as R&D intensity, must 
be taken analysed with caution. 
“Shareholder Activism by 
Institutional Investors: 
Evidence from CalPERS” 







For each target year, names of firms 
targeted, descriptions of shareholder 
resolutions filed with targets, 
percentage of target firm's outstanding 
common stock held, and outcomes of 
targeting are obtained from CalPERS. 
Analysis is conducted relative to the 
first year a firm is targeted by 
CalPERS. Analysis of the data using 
Probit model and Panel data 
Being a target firm Log of the market value of 
equity, percent of 
outstanding shares held by 
officers and directors, 
percent of shares held by 
institutional investors, 
market-to-book, five-year 
cumulative abnormal return 
• Level of institutional ownership and firm size 
affect the probability of being targeted, after 
controlling for prior stock price performance. 
• There is a significant positive stock price 
reaction for successful targeting events and a 
significant negative reaction for unsuccessful 
events.  
• Changes in operating performance do not reflect 
statistically significant improvement. 
• Shareholder activism is largely successful in 
changing governance structure and, when 
successful, results in a statistically significant 
increase in shareholder wealth. 
• On net, activism appears to be beneficial to 
CalPERS, as the value increase of its holdings 
from activism is almost $19 million over the 
1987-93 period. 
• Shareholder wealth increases for firms that 
adopt or settle and decreases for firms that resist.  
• No statistically significant change in operating 
performance is found. 
“Value creation or 
destruction? Hedge funds as 
shareholder activists” 
Christopher P. Clifford 
(2008) 
USA 1998-2005 To provide evidence on the gains of 
activism to the blockholder, it was 
calculated the raw holding period 
return to the hedge fund for both 
activists and passivists blockholders 
Holding period return - • Shareholder activism, at least from hedge funds, 
is associated with positive wealth creation in 
target firms. 
• Firms targeted by activists earn larger excess 
stock returns at the filling window and 
experience larger improvements in operating 
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performance than those of firms targeted by 
passivists. These firms also experience large 
decreases in total assets, while cash flows 
remain relatively unchanged. 
• The market responds favourably to more 
aggressive levels of activism than to less 
aggressive levels. 
• Hedge fund activists tend to be associated with 
longer lock-up and notification periods. 
• Hedge funds earn larger investment returns on 
their activist blocks than their passive blocks. 
“Entrepreneurial Shareholder 
Activism: Hedge Funds and 
Other Private Investors” 













Comparison of financial statistics 
between the target companies and the 
control group (firm performance, ROA, 
and others). Expansion of the 
univariate analysis by using pooled 
logistic models.  To determine how the 
market reacts to planned activism, it 
was computed the abnormal share price 
reactions around the initial 13D filing 
date. 
- - • Hedge fund targets earn, on average, 10.2% 
abnormal stock returns during the period 
surrounding the initial Schedule 13D filing, and 
other activist targets experience abnormal 
returns of 5.1%.  Hedge fund targets earn an 
additional 11.4% abnormal return during the 
subsequent year; other targets observe a 17.8% 
abnormal return. 
• Both groups are successful at gaining board 
representation on the target firm within 1 year of 
the initial finding. 
• Hedge fund activists target more profitable and 
financially healthy firms than do other 
entrepreneurial activists. 
• Hedge fund targets also have higher levels of 
cash on hand than evidenced by other activist 
targets. 
 
“Antecedents of Shareholder 
Activism in Target Firms: 
Evidence from a Multi-
Country Study” 
William Q. Judge, Ajai 






2003-2007 Since the dependent variables are 
dichotomous in nature, a binary logistic 
regression was used to test the 
hypotheses. A total of five models were 
tested.  Model 1 had all the control 
variables including industry effects and 
year effects. Model 2 had the main 
effect variables and a dummy for 
common law countries. With three 
interaction effects, it was needed to 
introduce the interaction variables one 
by one to minimize the collinearity 
between the main effect and interaction 
variables. This resulted in three more 
models (Models 3-5). 
Financially-driven 
shareholder activism 
and socially-driven  
shareholder activism 
Explanatory variables: 
firm size, ownership 
concentration, prior 
profitability, legal 
environment and social 
inequality 
Control variables: board 
structure, board size, board 
independence and CEO 
duality 
• The antecedents of shareholder activism vary by 
the motivation of the activist. 
• The two main goals of shareholder activism are: 
(a) to improve their targets financial 
performance and (b) to improve their targets 
social performance. 
• Firm size is unrelated to financial activism, but 
positively related to social activism. 
• Ownership concentration is negatively related to 
both financial and social activism. 
• Profitability is negatively related to financial 
activism, but positively related to social 
activism. 
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• These relationships in the case of financial 
activism are generally stronger in common law 
legal systems, whereas those in the case of 
social activism are generally stronger in 
environments with a greater level of income 
inequality. 
• It was found that the “exposure” to shareholder 
activism varies by the motivation of the activist, 
and the nature of the firm and its national 
context. 
“Is Carl Icahn Good for 
Long-Term Shareholders? A 
Case Study in Shareholder 
Activism” 
Vinod Venkiteshwaran, 
Subramanian R. Iyer and 
Ramesh P. Rao (2010) 
Not specified 1995-2007 After analyzing Icahn’s initial and 
amended filings, a series of tests using 
logit regressions were conducted in 
order to answer some of the research 
questions, such as “What kinds of 
companies attract Icahn?” and “Market 
reaction to the disclosure of Icahn’s 




abnormal stock returns, 
return on assets, capital 
expenditures, dividend 
payout, leverage, cash 
holdings, market to book 
ratio of equity 
• The authors found no significant changes in the 
target companies’ profitability, capital spending, 
stock repurchase and dividend payouts, cash 
balances, and leverage. 
• The data do suggest qualitative improvements in 
ROA and cash balances, and a decrease in 
leverage compared to a matched set of firms. 
• The findings are consistent with the widely held 
argument that activist investors focus on 
troubled capital structures and also work to limit 
manager’s ability to waste free cash flow by 
pressuring them to return more of it to 
shareholders. 
• Shareholder activists generally target firms with 
possible “free cash flow” problems. 
• Significant share price increases for the target 
companies (of about 10%) were observed 
around the time Icahn discloses his intentions 
publicly. 
• A significant number—indeed about one in 
three—of Icahn’s targets ended up being 
acquired or taken private within 18 months of 
his initial investment. 
• Icahn attained at least partial success in almost 
60% of his large investments. Even for those 
companies that were not eventually acquired by 
a third party, he was able to achieve at least 
some of his objectives in 75% of the cases. 
“Determinants and 
consequences of shareholder 
proposals: The cases of 
board election, charter 
Japan 2004-2013 Panel data probit regressions are used 
to estimate a firm's likelihood of 
receiving shareholder proposals based 
on a set of predictors. In each 
regression, the sample firms include all 
Dummy indicating 1 
if the firm received a 
particular type of 
proposal in the 
general meeting for 
Quick ratio, Tobin’s Q, 
shareholding by foreigners, 
shareholding by inside 
managers, ROA 
• Different types of shareholder proposals are 
triggered by varying firm characteristics. 
• Resolutions on the board election and charter 
amendments relating to corporate governance 
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amendment, and profit 
disposal” 
Tsung-ming Yeh (2017) 
publicly listed non-financial firms in 
Japan during the investigation period 
from 2004 to 2013. 
the fiscal year in 
question. 
receive higher votes than those for profit 
disposal. 
• Voting outcome is also positively associated 
with foreign shareholding, duration of the 
general meeting, and the firm's history of 
receiving proposals. 
• Resolutions initiated by large shareholders have 
positive impacts on the target firms, which 
reported positive announcement-associated 
abnormal returns. 
• Improvements in the operating performance are 
observed for firms passing board election 
resolutions and firms receiving charter 
amendment proposals from large shareholders. 
• The management increased share buyback and 
dividend payout in response to demands by large 
shareholders, although there was no significant 
change in the post-resolution operating 
performance. 
• The results indicate that statutorily powerful 
shareholder rights, when exercised by large 
shareholders, can have a positive impact. 
“Corporate governance and 
shareholder initiatives: 
Empirical evidence” 
Jonathan M. Karpoff, Paul 
H. Malatesta, Ralph A. 
Walkling (1996) 




Univariate comparisons and 
multivariate logistic regressions were 
used in order to study: the performance 
and control variables for the proposal 
and control firms, the effects of firm 
characteristics on the probability of a 
firm receiving a corporate governance 
shareholder proposal,  shareholder 
proposals' wealth effects and other. 
The dependent 
variable has a value 
of one for the 
proposal firms and 
zero for the control 
firms. 
The independent variables 
include performance 
measures and measures of 
firm size, institutional and 
insider ownership, and 
leverage. 
• Firms attracting governance proposals have poor 
prior performance, as measured by the market-
to-book ratio, operating return, and sales growth. 
This shows that proposal sponsors have reason 
to seek improvements in their target firms. 
• There is little evidence that operating returns 
improve after proposals. 
• The proposals also have negligible effects on 
company share values and top management 
turnover.. 
• Proposals that receive a majority of shareholder 
votes typically do not engender share price 
increases or discernible changes in firm policies. 
“Fad and fashion in 
shareholder activism: The 
landscape of shareholder 
resolutions, 1988-1998” 
Samuel B. Graves, Kathleen 
Rehbein, Sandra A. 
Waddock (2001) 
Not specified 1988-1998 Shareholder resolutions for the period 
1988–1998 were collapsed into 27 
general categories related to specific 
issues plus a miscellaneous category 
containing 25 resolutions. During the 
eleven-year period, some 2,944 
proxies, sorted into the 27 categories, 
were recorded by the IRRC and 
included in the analysis. 
- - • The most popular categories of shareholder 
resolutions by the time of the study were South 
Africa and Environment. 
• The issues that received considerably less 
attention were abortion/contraception, 
compensation, animal rights, charitable 
contributions and health. This was in part 
because interest in them started later than 
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interest in the more popular areas or because 
interest diminished considerably during the 
period of study. 
• The data suggests that issues can follow 
different patterns over time:  some issues arise 
(and die) abruptly, while others remain of 
substantial interest without being resolved or 
disappearing over relatively long periods of 
time. 
• It was possible to obtain various examples of 
different types of issues: out-of-fashion issues, 
old stand-by issues, the emerging issues, waxing 
and waning issues. 
“When Does Institutional 
Investor Activism Increase 
Shareholder Value? The 
Carbon Disclosure Project” 
Eun-Hee Kim, Thomas Lyon 
(2011) 
Not specified. 2006 The data include the FT Global 500 
companies. 
To test the hypotheses, two steps were 
needed: first calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns on the day of CDP 
disclosure and on the day of Russia’s 
ratification of the Kyoto protocol using 
the event study methodology that 
focuses on mean stock price effects. 
Second, run regressions using the 
cumulative abnormal returns calculated 
in the first step as dependent variables. 
Cumulative abnormal 
returns on the day of 
CDP disclosure and 
on the day of 
Russia’s ratification 
of the Kyoto 
protocol. 
Variables of interest such as 
whether companies 
participate in the CDP or 
not, and whether companies 
are headquartered in 
countries that had ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol as of 
Russia’s ratification on 
October 22, 2004. 
• There is no systematic evidence that CDP 
participation, in and of itself, directly increased 
share prices and, therefore, shareholder value, 
which suggests that participation was not 
entirely voluntary, but was the result of pressure 
from shareholders, regulators, and the 
institutional investors involved in the CDP. 
• CDP participants were treated better by 
investors when exogenous events caused the 
likelihood of climate change regulation to rise. 
• The findings demonstrate that institutional 
investor activism toward climate change can 
increase shareholder value when the external 
business environment becomes more climate 
conscious. 
“Corporate governance 
proposals and shareholder 
activism: the role of 
institutional investors” 
Stuart L. Gillan, Laura T. 
Starks (2000) 
Not specified. 1987-1994 Initial data set consists of 2042 
shareholder proposals submitted at 452 
companies over the 1987-1994 proxy 
sample period.  Initially the voting 
patterns are studied. Then the voting 
outcomes are analysed in more depth 
by focusing on the voting results by 
particular issues addressed and the 
identity of the sponsors. 
Percentage of votes, 
short-term market 
reaction 
Sponsor, percentage of 
institutional ownership, 
takeover-related, takeover-
sponsor interaction, relative 
return, times submitted, 
percentage of votes, times 
submitted 
• Shareholder voting and stock market reaction 
depend on the issues addressed by the proposals 
as well as the identity of the proposal sponsor. 
• Proposals sponsored by the so-called gadflys 
(active individual investors) gather fewer votes 
and are associated with a slight positive impact 
on stock prices. 
• In contrast, proposals sponsored by institutional 
investors (i.e., public pension funds) or 
coordinated groups of investors receive 
significantly more votes and appear to have 
some small but measurable negative impact on 
stock prices. 




• Activism of institutional investors and 
coordinated groups appears to have slightly 
more success. 
• Proposals often sponsored by the so-called 
gadfly investors such as executive 
compensation, director ownership, and the 
limitation of director terms receive low voting 
support, and thus are not perceived by other 
shareholders as being effective enough in 
pressuring corporate management to pursue 
reform. The similarity of issues and voting 
results across institutional investors and 
coordinated groups suggests that they act as 
substitutes in applying pressure to managers. 
